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RECENT DECISIONS
forbids these unions when solemnized within its boundaries.17
Many states, on the other hand, proscribe uncle-niece marriages
by statutory enactment.18 Thus, although such a validly contracted
foreign marriage is not deemed void as being opposed to the generally
accepted opinion of Christendom, it is declared invalid in those juris-
dictions wherein the prohibitory statute is given extraterritorial ap-
plication to domiciliaries.19 Not all states, however, give this effect
to their inhibitive statutes.20 The basis used in determining the scope
of the statutes is the intent of the legislature.
21
The instant case delineates the New York position on the two
exceptions to the general rule. The Court of Appeals refused to
consider the uncle-niece marriage involved as repugnant to the policy
of the state and refrained from applying the domestic statute pro-
hibiting such unions to a valid foreign marriage of its domiciliaries. 22
This decision clearly aligns New York with those jurisdictions
favoring the broadest interpretation of the general rule that the lex
loci contractus should control.23
X
CORO'ORTIONS - REIMBURSEMENT FOR LITIGATION EXPENSES
INCURRED IN DEFENDING CRIMINAL ACTION DENIED.-The peti-
tioner, former vice-president and director of defendant corporation,
was indicted by a federal grand jury for alleged violations of the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act.' He pleaded nolo contendere 2 and was
17 Campione v. Campione, 201 Misc. 590, 107 N. Y. S. 2d 170 (Sup. Ct.
1951) ; Fensterwald v. Burk, 129 Md. 131, 98 At. 358 (1916).
18See, e.g., N. Y. Dom. IZE LAw §5(3); CAL. CiV. CODE §59 (1951);
ILL. REV. STAT. c. 89, § 1 (1951) ; MAss. AxN. LAws c. 207, § 2 (1933).
19 Matter of De Wilton, [1900] 2 Ch. 481 (marriage between Jewish uncle
and niece, English domiciliaries, deemed invalid in England although it was
validly contracted abroad).
20 See Van Voorhis v. Brintnall, 86 N. Y. 18 (1881); Matter of Perez, 219
P. 2d 35 (Cal. 1950) ; Putnam v. Putnam, 25 Mass. 433 (1829). Those states
which have adopted the Uniform Marriage Evasion Act determine the validity
of marriages of foreign domiciliaries within their jurisdiction by applying
the laws of the domicile of the parties. Beaudoin v. Beaudoin, 270 App. Div.
631, 62 N. Y. S. 2d 920 (3d Dep't 1946).
21L See Van Voorhis v. Brintnall, mtpra note 20 at 35.
2 2 N. Y. Dom. Rar_ LAW § 5(3).23 But cf. Cunningham v. Cunningham, 206 N. Y. 341, 99 N. E. 845 (1912).
126 STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U. S. C. § 1 (1946).
2 FED. R. CiRi. P. 11. Although a plea of noto contendere is not to be
deemed an admission of facts in any other action [38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15
U. S. C. § 16 (1946)] the trial court in the instant civil case held that the
imposition of a fine was such an adjudication of defendant's negligence in the
performance of his duties as to deny him the right to reimbursement under
1953 ]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
fined $500. To recover litigation expenses incurred as a result of
this prosecution, the present petition was brought under the General
Corporation Law.3 The Court of Appeals in affirming a dismissal of
the complaint held that the New York statute does not entitle an
officer of a corporation to reimbursement for expenses incurred in
defense of a criminal proceeding. Matter of Schwarz z,. General
Aniline & Film Corp., 305 N. Y. 395, 113 N. E. 2d 533 (1953).
At common law it has been held that a corporation was under
no obligation to reimburse its officers or directors for litigation ex-
penses incurred in defense of suits brought against them in their rep-
resentative capacity.4 Thus in New York Dock Co. v. McCollum 5
an action was brought by a corporation for a declaratory judgment to
quell demands for reimbursement by directors who had successfully
defended a stockholders' suit. The court there decided that in the
absence of an express contract therefor, a corporation was not obliged
to reimburse the directors on the theory of implied contract. But
whether a corporation could expressly contract with directors for
indemnification was not clear." Case law, however, indicates two
theories by which corporate officials, guilty of no wrongdoing,7 could
recover litigation expenses. Under one theory, reimbursement may
be had where the defense of the action has brought some benefit to
the corporation; 8 under the other, reimbursement could be effected
by unanimous consent of the stockholders. 9 Nevertheless, a defini-
tive statement regarding the legality of indemnity agreements between
a corporation and its officials is lacking. 10 It had been suggested that
the broad language of the New York corporation laws would allow
Section 64 of the General Corporation Law. Matter of Schwarz v. General
Aniline & Film Corp., 198 Misc. 1046, 102 N. Y. S. 2d 325 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
3 N. Y. GEN. CORP. LAW §§ 64-68.
4 Bailey v. Bush Terminal Co., 46 N. Y. S. 2d 877 (Sup. Ct. 1943),
aff'd mere., 267 App. Div. 899, 48 N. Y. S. 2d 324 (1st Dep't), aff'd mere.,
293 N. Y. 735, 56 N. E. 2d 739 (1944) ; see PRASHKER, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON CORPORATIONS 804 (2d ed. 1949). Contra: Solimine v. Hollander, 129
N. J. Eq. 264, 19 A. 2d 344 (1941).
5 173 Misc. 106, 16 N. Y. S. 2d 844 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
6 See 1945 LEG. Doc. No. 65(E), REP'oRT, N. Y. LAW REVISION Coll MIS-
SION 131, 154-156 (1945).
7 "It would certainly seem to be a travesty upon justice that the company
should be compelled to pay the expenses of a suit brought by minority stock-
holders for the purpose of restoring delinquent trustees to a proper sense of
their duties." McConnell v. Combination Min. & Mill. Co., 31 Mont. 563,
79 Pac. 248, 251 (1905).
8 See Godley v. Crandall & Godley Co., 181 App. Div. 75, 78, 168 N. Y.
Supp. 251, 254 (1st Dep't 1917), af'd mere., 227 N. Y. 656, 126 N. E. 908
(1920) ; New York Dock Co. v. McCollum, supra note 5 at 111, 16 N. Y. S.
2d at 849; Griesse v. Lang, 37 Ohio App. 553, 175 N. E. 222, 223 (1931).
9 See Griesse v. Lang, supra note 8.
10 See Jervis, Corporate Agreements to Pay Directors' Expenses in Stock-
holders' Stits, 40 COL. L. REv. 1192, 1194 (1940).
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inclusion of such agreements in certificates of incorporation and in
by-laws. 11
To deny reimbursement to innocent officers and directors, it was
urged, would discourage the less affluent, albeit competent, indi-
viduals from assuming these positions of responsibility.' 2 Further-
more, officials of limited means would be deprived of the right to
competent counsel in the expensive corporate litigation, and would
be subject to pressures exerted by litigious stockholders who threaten
groundless suits.13
With these objections in mind,'1 4 therefore, the legislature of the
State of New York enacted two types of remedial statutes. The
first of these, permissive in nature, granted authorization to include
reimbursement provisions in new certificates of incorporation or to
modify existing certificates or by-laws by addition of such provi-
sions.15  The other remedial statute' 6 allowed officers or directors
to recover, by court action, expenses incurred in the successful 17 de-
fense of "any action, suit or proceeding" brought by the corporation
or in its behalf. The legislature, however, recognizing the need for
a more inclusive statute, expanded the scope of the statute to permit
reimbursement to directors, officers, and "employes" for such ex-
penses.' 8 It has also removed the limitation that the action which
engendered the expenses be one by the corporation or in its behalf.19
In deciding the instant case, the court has held that criminal
proceedings are not compensable actions within the intendment of
the statute. Therefore, any corporate official indicted, as in this
case, for criminal violations of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, or for
11Id. at 1202. See N. Y. GEN. CoRp. LAW § 13(2) (which states that
"[the certificate of incorporation . . .may contain any provision for the regu-
lation of its business and the conduct of its affairs. . . .") ; N. Y. GENi. Cornt.
LAW § 14(5) (which grants the power to a corporation ". .. to make by-laws,
not inconsistent with law, for the management of its business, [and] the
regulation of its affairs. .. ").
12 See Washington, Litigation Expenses of Corporate Directors in Stock-
holders' Suits, 40 CoL. L. Rzv. 431, 432, 451 (1940).
13 See Solimine v. Hollander, 129 N. J. Eq. 264, 19 A. 2d 344, 348 (1941).
14 See 1945 LEG. Doc. No. 65(E), REPORT, N. Y. LAW REVIsION CommIs-
soN 131, 149-166 (1945).
15 N. Y. GEN. CoRP. LAW § 27-a (now GEr. Coap. LAW § 63). For such
provisions, see 1945 LEG. Doc. No. 65(E), REPORT, N. Y. LAW REv sION CoM-
MISSION 131, 170-174 (1945).
'6N. Y. GEN. CoRP. LAW § 6 1-a (now embodied in GEN. CoRP. LAW§§ 64-68).
'7 In the event of a settlement with the court's approval, it is within judicial
discretion to allow reimbursement. Id. § 67.
18 Id. §64.
29 See 1945 LEG. Doc. No. 65(E), REPORT, N. Y. LAW REVIsION COMMIS-
sION 131, 158-166 (1945). The introduction of similar statutes in other states
is indicative of the trend. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, c. 1, § 122(10) (1953);
Ky. REv. STAT. § 271.375 (Baldwin, 1953); N. J. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, c. 3, § 14
(Supp. 1952).
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any other criminal act connected with the management of a corpora-
tion, may not look to the corporation for recovery of his litigation
expenses.2 0  In a divided court, the majority was of the opinion that
inasmuch as the statute is in derogation of the common law it should
be strictly construed.21 The dissenting judges, in sharp contrast,
contended that compensation for criminal proceedings was within the
intention of the legislators 22 as manifested, among other things, by
the ". . . broad and . . . all-inclusive . . . 23 wording of the statute.
The court, in denying reimbursement, stated that "[i]t would
be a very strange public policy, indeed, which would set up legal
machinery whereby one charged with, or convicted of, a crime, of
whatever kind, could require the corporation . . . to pay his legal
expenses." 24 Where guilt is established, the statement appears to
be correct.
A
CUSTODY - JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR FULL FAITH
AND CREDIT.-In a habeas corpus proceeding to regain custody of
three children, Ohio courts felt bound under the full faith and credit
clause of the Constitution I to recognize a Wisconsin decree, rendered
in an ex parte divorce action, granting custody of the children to their
father.2 The United States Supreme Court reversed and held that
full faith and credit need not be given to a custody decree where the
court awarding the decree lacked in personam jurisdiction over the
mother. May v. Anderson, 345 U. S. 528 (1953).
The purpose of the full faith and credit clause of the Consti-
tution as declared by the United States Supreme Court is that
" . litigation once pursued to judgment shall be as conclusive of
the rights of the parties in every other court as in that where thejudgment was rendered so that a cause of action merged in a judg-
20 In the event of a conviction, the official cannot be held personally liable
to the corporation for losses caused by his acts if it can be shown that he
acted in good faith and with the intention of benefiting the corporation.
Simon v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 179 Misc. 202, 38 N. Y. S. 2d 270 (Sup.
Ct. 1942), aff'd mern., 267 App. Div. 890, 47 N. Y. S. 2d 589 (1st Dep't 1944).21 See Matter of Schwarz v. General Aniline & Film Corp., 305 N. Y. 395,
404-406, 113 N. E. 2d 533, 537-538 (1953) (concurring opinion).
22 Id. at 407-409, 113 N. E. 2d at 538-540 (dissenting opinion).
23 Id. at 407, 113 N. E. 2d at 539.
24 Id. at 402, 113 N. E. 2d at 536 (emphasis added).
1 "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State." U. S. CONST. Art.
IV, § 1.
2 Anderson v. May, 91 Ohio App. 557, 107 N. E. 2d 358, appeal dismissed,
157 Ohio St. 436, 105 N. E. 2d 648 (1952).
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